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Abstract
We study the impact of positive public good spillovers on interna-
tional capital tax competition in a spatial economy with two countries
imperfectly integrated and with diﬀerent levels of productivity. Firstly
we analyze the outcomes with local public goods and with interregional
public good spillovers. Even if the high productivity country chooses
a higher level of tax at the equilibrium, a majority of firms locate here
to enjoy higher economies of scale. Introducing public good spillovers
yields to a lower tax gap and higher agglomeration. Secondly, we ex-
hibit the resulting regional inequalities. Finally, analyzing the diﬀerent
kinds of fiscal externalities, we show that public good spillovers may
aggravate the suboptimality of the tax in one country and mitigate it
in the other country.
1
1 Introduction
Public expenditures often generate international spillovers. Until now, no
attention has been given to their impact in a context of tax competition
with spatial disparities. Hence, the objective of this paper is to incorporate
public good spillovers in a model of asymmetric tax competition. Using
a New Economic Geography framework that allows to endogenize spatial
disparities, we investigate the size of public good spillovers, their impact on
fiscal policies,on the location of firms and on workers’ welfare.
The literature on tax competition has shown, in the past two decades,
that capital mobility leads governments to adopt a strategical behavior in
the design of their fiscal policies1. According to Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986), governments set capital taxes strategically in order to prevent cap-
ital outflows, which induces a race to the bottom in capital taxes ending
with a suboptimal level of public good provision. However, the location of
activities driven by fiscal policies is the only source of interdependence be-
tween governments in most of the models of capital tax competition, whereas
other channels of interdependence may aﬀect this strategic behavior. There-
fore, we have to identify these diﬀerent possible channels of interdependence
between governments in order to tackle tax competition.
On the one hand, international trade and specialisation caused by imper-
fect competition produces an economic interdependence between countries.
The decline of transport costs gives rise to spatial disparities of economic
activities, as Krugman (1991) argues in its core-periphery model. In other
words, capital mobility is also aﬀected by the location forces coming from
the private sector. Recent models analyze tax competition within an eco-
nomic geography framework in order to endogenize these location forces.
They highlight the eﬀect of transport costs on tax base elasticity with re-
spect to the fiscal policy when the private sector is imperfectly competitive.
Indeed, everything else equal, unless competition of firms is too tighted on
the largest market, it may be more profitable to locate in this market. It
makes it possible to meet a larger demand, to exploit economies of scale and
to save on trade costs involved by exportation. As a consequence, the gov-
ernment may tax the “agglomeration rent” that firms enjoy. This is what
Ludema and Wooton (1998), Kind et al. (1998) and Baldwin and Krugman
(2004) find in their asymmetric tax competition models since they show that
the government of the largest country can increase its capital tax without
suﬀering from a capital outflow2. Finally, as pointed out by Ottaviano and
1For a survey see Wildasin and Wilson (2003).
2These theoretical predictions are supported by empirical studies such as Krogstrup
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Van Ypersele and by Gaigné and Riou (2005), capital tax competition in an
imperfect competition environment leads to two sorts of ineﬃciencies : the
well-known ineﬃciency of the tax levels and the size of the public sector,
and an ineﬃcient location of the private sector caused by the tax gap3.
On the other hand, public good spillovers constitute an other channel
of interdependence between governments. Indeed, recall that tax revenues
are devoted to the financing of the national public sector according to Mus-
grave’s (1989) definition of state functions. However, expenditures on na-
tional public services can have beneficial or harmful eﬀects onto residents
in nearby countries. The examples of public expenditures that can have
spillovers eﬀects in neighboring countries are numerous: public transport
infrastructures improve the accessibility of neighboring countries and favors
international trade, education and publicly funded research and develop-
ment eﬀorts may benefit other countries through knowledge externalities,
public spendings aimed at reducing pollution improve the international en-
vironment. Case Rosen and Hines (1993), Baicker (1995) or Murdoch, Rah-
matian and Thayer (1993) provide good empirical evidence for the existence
of such positive public good spillovers. According to Oates (1972), it induces
a suboptimal provision of public good when residents are immobile, because
governments ignore the positive eﬀects of their public good provision for non-
residents4. However, this is a model à la Tiebout (1956) where residents are
both recipients and taxpayers of public spendings. This may introduce a bias
toward eﬃciency of public good provision even with spillovers5. Moreover,
this framework could be less relevant in so far as labor mobility is much less
significant than capital mobility, especially in European countries. Taking
into account both public good spillovers and the fiscal externalities caused
by capital tax competition could worsen this suboptimality and weaken the
public sector’s durability.
To resume, few models consider public good spillovers in a context of
(2003) which shows that the sensitivity of capital flows to fiscal policies depends on ag-
glomeration economies.
3 In Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005), tax competition leads to subsidies to capital
funded through taxes on labor. Hence public spendings takes the form of a redistribution
between factors, so that there are no public goods.
4Later, Besley and Coate (2003) come back to Oates’ Decentralization Theorem and
analyze, following a political economy approach, the government’s behavior in presence of
public good spillovers when the economy is made of heterogenous jurisdictions.
5Governements internalize fiscal externalities through the location constraint because
their citizen are not only recipients of the public sector but also their taxpayers. Thus,
Wellisch (1992a, 1992b) shows that the ineﬃciency of public good provision no longer
holds when residents are completely mobile.
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international capital tax competition even if the coexistence of these two
kinds of interdependence (fiscal and public spending externalities) between
governments seems to be relevant. Firstly, Bjortvan and Schjelderup (2002)
introduce public good spillovers in the Zodrow-Mieszkowski (1986) frame-
work of symmetric capital tax competition. They show that these spillovers
counteract the tax competition distortion even if the size of the public sec-
tor remains suboptimal6. Indeed, international spillovers, as well as worker’s
mobility, represent a link between countries which tends to equalize interna-
tional welfare. Secondly, Kobayashi, Kunizaki and Nakamura (2003) analyze
the eﬀect of public good spillovers when governments do not only compete
in tax rates but also in their pattern of public spending. These models show
how public good spillovers aﬀect the outcome of symmetric tax competi-
tion and its ineﬃciency. Nevertheless they ignore the emergence of spatial
disparities caused by market location forces in an imperfectly competitive
economy7. Therefore, they cannot explore how spatial disparities, shaped
by the decline of transport costs, influence tax competition and the size of
the public sector faced with spillovers. This is the gap we want to fill in this
paper.
To explore these questions, we build an economic geography framework
à la Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) which is presented in the next
section. Two countries compete to attract firms in an environment of imper-
fect competition with transport costs. These countries diﬀer in their level
of productivity in the manufacturing sector and we consider that capital
mobility depends on the spatial diﬀerences in net profits. The public sector
can generate positive spillovers whose intensity may be underestimated by
governments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the third section, we
compare the outcomes of tax competition with local public goods and with
international public good spillovers. Asymmetric tax competition results in
a majority of firms located in the high productivity country where the level
of taxation is higher. Public good spillovers foster agglomeration because
they lead to a lower tax gap. Hence it results in international disparities
that we analyze in section four. We show that consumers’ surplus and
public good provision are higher in the high productivity country. The
decline of transport of transport costs favors the convergence of international
welfare, while public good spillovers strengthen the diﬀerence of consumer’s
6The suboptimal size of the public sector comes exclusively from the free-riding behav-
ior of governments when the public good is pure.
7 In these models, equilibrium taxes are symmetric and then public good provision is
equal across regions.
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surplus. Finally, we carry out an eﬃciency analysis in the subsequent section
and we isolate diﬀerent kinds of externalities. While tax competition leads
to a positive fiscal externality in both countries because of the tax base
erosion eﬀect, symmetric public good spillovers leads to a fiscal externality
whose sign and intensity diﬀer across countries depending on their tax base
elasticities.
2 The model
We consider an economy with two large countries, labelled r = 1, 2. The
economy is endowed with N firms and 2L workers equally distributed across
countries (Lr = Ls = L). There are two sectors, a public sector and a pri-
vate one. The public sector of each country is represented by a government
levying a unitary tax on firms and providing a public good to domestic
households. The private sector consists of a modern industry (M) and a
traditional one (T ). The M-sector produces a continuum of varieties of a hor-
izontally diﬀerentiated product under increasing returns, using workers as
the only input. The T-sector produces a homogenous good (the numéraire)
under constant returns, using also workers as the only input. Firms of the
M-sector are perfectly mobile between countries. Workers are not mobile
between countries but are mobile between private sectors.
2.1 Consumption
Preferences for the goods produced in the private sector are identical across
workers and, following Ottaviano et al. (2002), are captured by a quasi-
linear quadratic utility given by:
u(.) = α
Z N
0
q (i) di− β − γ
2
Z N
0
[q (i)]2 di− γ
2
∙Z N
0
q (i) di
¸2
+ qO (1)
where α > 0 and β > γ > 0. In this expression, α measures the intensity
of preferences for the diﬀerentiated product with respect to the numéraire.
The condition β > γ implies that workers have a preference for variety.
Finally, q (i) is the quantity of variety i ∈ [0, N ] and qO the quantity of the
numéraire. Each worker is endowed with qO > 0 units of the numéraire. The
initial endowment is supposed to be large enough for her/his consumption of
the numéraire to be strictly positive at the market outcome. Her/his budget
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constraint can then be written as follows:Z N
0
p (i) q (i) di+ qO = qO + yr (2)
where p (i) is the consumer price of variety i and yr is the workers’s net
income residing in country r with
yr ≡ wr
with wr the wage tax prevailing in country r. Given the assumption of
symmetry between varieties, solving the consumption problem yields the
demand functions for a representative variety located in r from country r
(qrr) and country s with s 6= r (qrs):
qrr = a− (b+ cN) prr + cPr qrs = a− (b+ cN) prs + cPs (3)
where
a ≡ α/ [β + (N − 1) γ] b ≡ 1/ [β + (N − 1) γ] c ≡ γ/ (β − γ) [β + (N − 1) γ]
and prr (resp., prs) is the price of a variety located in country r to consumers
of country r (resp., s). Finally,
Pr = Nrprr +Nspsr Ps = Nrprs +Nspss (4)
are the price indices (i.e., N times the average price) of varieties in country r
and in country s, respectively, with Nr and Ns the number of varieties/firms
located in r and s.
2.2 The private sector
The traditional sector produces a homogeneous good under perfect compe-
tition and constant returns to scale. One unit of output requires one unit
of labor. The T-good is costlessly traded between countries so that its price
is the same everywhere. This makes that good the natural choice for the
numéraire, which implies that price of the T-good and, the equilibrium wage
of immobile workers are equal to one everywhere. Therefore, the T-sector is
not taxed since profits are zero.
The modern sector supplies varieties under increasing returns to scale
and monopolistic competition. For a firm located in country r, the produc-
tion of any variety requires a fixed amount φr of labor L with
φ2 > φ1
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In other words, we assume that country 1 has an advantage in terms of
productivity. We define θ as the productivity wedge between countries given
by θ = φ1−φ2 < 0. Hence, as suggested by Bjorvatn and Schelderup (2002)
we focus on asymmetric tax competition to explore the role of public good
spillovers.
There exists a one-to-one correspondence between firms and varieties.
Firms of M-sector compete within a large group of firms. The total mass
of firms in this sector is fixed and is equal to N8. We consider a market
structure with monopolistic competition in which entry is restricted instead
of being free. Thus, firms have a market power and will earn positive profits
which will be taxed by local governments. We consider that all profits are
equally distributed to households located in the economy. We assume that
each resident owns an equal share of the total stock of capital.
Varieties of M-good are traded at a cost of τ units of the numéraire per
unit shipped between the two countries. As firms bear trade costs, gross
profits of a representative firm in country r are as follows:
Πr = prrqrrLr + (prs − τ) qrsLs with r 6= s (5)
where Lr (resp., Ls) is the number of workers located in country r (resp.,
s). Note that because labor is mobile between sectors, the wage rate is fixed
to 1 in the M-sector. Nevertheless, this will be verified only if the sector T
is always active in both countries. Then, we have to ensure that a single
location alone cannot supply the world demand in the homogeneous good.
The condition is 1 < 2qO.9.
When producers maximize profits, they take the price indices as given.
Nevertheless, the market as a whole has a non negligible impact on each
firm’s choice in that each firm must account for the distribution of all firms’
prices through an aggregate statistics (the price index) in order to find its
equilibrium price. Thus, the market solution is given by a Nash equilibrium
with a continuum of players in which prices are interdependent. The profit-
maximizing prices are the same obtained by Ottaviano et al. (2002) and are
given by
prr =
1
2
2a+ τc(N −Nr)
cN + 2b
prs = pss +
τ
2
(6)
8Picard et al. (2004) have the same assumption in a spatial version of Dixit-Stiglitz
model.
9An other condition indicates that full agglomeration of the modern sector in one
region is not suﬃcient to promote equilibrium in the labor market of this region, that is
L > 2φrN where φrN is the number of workers employed in the modern sector when a
core-periphery configuration emerges.
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Freight absorption by firms located for instance in r is a decreasing
function of their relative number. The reason is that as Nr falls, the market
in country s becomes more crowded then pushing down local prices. As a
result, the elasticity of demand for firms located in r rises on foreign sales
while falling on domestic ones. The result is that they find convenient to
reduce their operating margins on foreign sales while increasing them on
domestic sales (Brander and Krugman, 1983).
By inspection, it is readily verified that prr is increasing in τ because
the local firms are more protected against foreign competition. By contrast,
prs − τ is decreasing because it is now more diﬃcult for firms to sell on the
foreign market. As firms’ prices net of trade costs have to be positive for
any distribution of workers, we assume throughout this paper that
τ < τ trade ≡
2a
2b+ cN
. (7)
This condition also guarantees that it is always profitable for a firm to export
to the other country.
After introducing (3) and (4) in (5), we get the equilibrium gross profits
earned by a firm established in r on the market of the country r and s with
Πr ≡ (b+ cn) (prr)2 L+ (b+ cn) (prs − τ)2 L
In our model, price competition acts as a dispersion force while the diﬀerence
in productivity favors firm clustering in the high productivity country.
Before evaluating the eﬀects of public intervention on existing location
forces in the next section, we first define the free-market equilibrium λM
governed by the spatial diﬀerences in gross profits,
πr = Πr − φr (8)
An interior equilibrium exists if and only if πr = πs. This leads to the
following location equilibrium:
λM =
1
2
− θ cN + 2b
LcN (cN + b) τ2
(9)
characterized by a majority of firms in the country 1 because of higher in-
creasing returns to scale. This agglomeration increases with the productivity
wedge and the decline of trade costs, until we reach the core periphery equi-
librium. Such a configuration occurs for all θ below the threshold
θMagglo = −
LcN (b+ cN)
2 (cN + 2b)
τ2
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As interior equilibria reflect the most common patterns of location, we will
restrict our attention to values of the productivity wedge higher than this
threshold in what follows.
2.3 The public sector
We define Gr as the amount of total public expenditures in country r. Fur-
thermore, we assume that public goods generate positive spillovers across
countries. Non residents enjoy positive spillovers because they benefit from
a better environment or tourism amenities for example. Indeed, workers are
not completely immobile, especially those located near the frontiers. They
can occasionally move to neighboring countries to enjoy recreation facilities
which are not provided in their country. Hence we can consider that they
are immobile only with respect to the private sector and the labor market to
which they need a good daily access; whereas they are mobile with respect
to the amenities and infrastructures financed by the public sector that they
will occasionally need/want to enjoy10.
The national public sector enter the utility function of the resident as
follows
Ur = u (.) + μ (Gr + ρGs) (10)
where 0 < ρ < 1 is the degree of spillovers so that Gr + ρGs stands for the
eﬀective amount of public goods that residents of country r benefit from.
We can distinguish two polar cases : when ρ = 0 it is a local public good
whereas when ρ = 1 it is a pure public good. Thus, the intensity of spillovers
is assumed to be variable but symmetric across countries. The parameter
μ represents the specific importance of the public sector compared to the
private one. Because of the distortions caused by imperfect competition in
the private market, it seems relevant that governments give a more impor-
tant weight to the public sector. Observe that this parameter is also used
by Besley and Coate (2003) and Andersson and Forslid (2003) to reflect the
diﬀerent extent to which citizens value the public good.
The public sector is represented in each country by a government act-
ing independently in a fully decentralized framework. We consider that
this government is benevolent, so he chooses the level of the unit tax on
profits tr which maximizes its perception about the aggregate welfare of
10Thus, we seek to reach a compromise between models à la Tiebout where tax base is
made of perfectly mobile citizens and models of capital tax competition where tax base is
often made of perfectly mobile physical capital and immobile citizens.
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workers/consumers living in its jurisdiction :
Fr = SrL+ L+
1
2
(πrλrN + πsλsN) + μ (Gr + ωρGs) (11)
with 0 < ω < 1 the government’s internalization degree of public good
spillovers, and Sr the consumer’s surplus in country r given by
Sr =
a2N
2b
− a(Nrprr +Nspsr) +
b+ cN
2
(Nrp
2
rr +Nsp
2
sr)−
c
2
(Nrprr +Nspsr)
2
where prices are given by (6). Thus, the objective function is the sum of
four components: the aggregate income L, the aggregate consumer surplus
LSr, the agregate capital income ((πrλrN + πsλsN)/2), and the available
level of public goods according to its government (μ (Gr + ωρGs)). Observe
that we know from the location stage that π1 = π2. Hence (11) becomes
Fr = SrL+ L+ πrN/2 + μ (Gr + ωρGs).
We can make two comments about this objective function. Firstly, asym-
metric capital tax competition aﬀects consumer’s surplus via the spatial al-
location of firms. Thus, governments want to attract the maximum of firms
in order to increase its consumers’ surplus, because the stronger competi-
tion is on the private market, the lower are prices11. Secondly, the extent to
which public good spillovers coming from the neighboring country is welfare
enhancing according to a government varies with respect to its internal-
ization degree. Indeed, contrary to Bjortvan and Schjelderup (2002), we
assume that the international government has got an imperfect information
about the extent of public good spillovers12. Thus we follow the approach
adopted by Kobayashi, Kunizaki and Nakamura (2003) by assuming that
international governments underestimate the intensity of such spillovers13.
To resume, our framework is diﬀerent from the previous literature of public
good spillovers and capital tax competition because it combines imperfect
information of local governments with respect to public good spillovers and
imperfect competition in the private market, both of them aﬀecting residents
welfare.
11Such a mechanism cannot occur in Bjortvan and Schjelderup’s framework because the
private sector is perfectly competitive.
12 In their model, they assume that regional governments know exactly the intensity of
public good spillovers its residents benefit from (according to them ω = 1).
13This approach is supported by Case et al. (1993) who mention : “actions of govern-
ments that respond to spillovers that they perceive but that do not really exist”. In other
words, governments may under-estimate or over-estimate the extent of public spillovers.
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Finally, public expenditures in each country are financed by tax revenues
collected thanks to a unitary source-based tax tr on firm’s profit, so the
maximization of its residents’ welfare is subject to the following budget
constraint :
Gr = trλrN (12)
where λr is the share of firms located in country r with λr + λs = 1.
2.4 Sequence of events
There are two types of actors: firms and governments. In the first stage, each
government chooses simultaneously its tax on firms’ profit taking as given
the decision of the other government, and anticipating the private sector
outcomes and the resulting location equilibrium. In stage 2, given the taxes
announced by the two governments, firms choose their place of production.
Information of players is common knowledge and the game is solved by a
sub-game perfect equilibrium involving backward induction beginning with
the last stage. We first determine the location equilibrium for given taxes
which is such that π1 = π2, with πr = Πr − φr − tr and we get
λ (t1, t2) =
1
2
− (cN + 2b) t1 − t2 + θ
cNL (b+ cN) τ2
(13)
As governments anticipate this behavior of firms with respect to their loca-
tion choice, we will describe the policy outcome at the first stage given by
Nash taxes. Then we will describe the location equilibrium that we get by
inserting Nash taxes values in (13).
3 Outcome in a decentralized economy
Firstly we study the case when each local government provide local public
goods. Then we introduce positive public good spillovers across countries in
this framework in order to see if it aﬀects the tax setting.
3.1 With local public goods
The only public goods that residents benefit from are those provided by
their government because public goods are exclusively local ones. Thus we
assume that ρ = 0. Hence the government’s objective function is the sum
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of its local public good provision and the aggregate consumer surplus. The
maximization program is given by
tr arg Max LSr + L+
πr
2
N + μGr
s.c Gr = trλrN
(14)
withGr = trλr (tr, ts)N the level of local public goods and Sr = Sr (λr (tr, ts))
the consumer surplus which depends the location of firms for given fiscal
policies.
Thus spatial interaction between governments is only indirect as Revelli
(2004) means. He argues that governments can interact through three chan-
nels : preferences, constraints and expectations. International capital tax
competition with local public goods exclusively refers to the interdependence
acting through the budgetary constraints. Each government independently
chooses its tax to maximize the welfare of its own residents without taking
account the impacts of its choice on the size of the tax base available to the
other government.
3.1.1 Stage 1: Nash tax equilibrium
Maximizing (14) with respect to the capital tax tr, we get the first order
condition of the government:
L
∂Sr
∂λr
∂λr
∂tr
+
N
2
∙
∂Πr
∂λr
∂λr
∂tr
+ 1
¸
+ μN
∙
∂λr
∂tr
tr + λr
¸
= 0 (15)
where λr is given by (13). Note that ∂λr/∂tr < 0 because of the tax base
erosion eﬀect: everything else equal, an unilateral increase of the capital
tax leads to a capital outflow. The second term in the first order condition
represents the eﬀect of an unilateral capital tax increase on the agregate
capital income of residents (∂ (πrN/2) /∂tr). On the one hand, each gov-
ernment has incentives to choose a low level of capital taxes to avoid from
suﬀering a capital outflow. Indeed, it would be harmful for the provision of
public good, for consumer surplus and for the net capital income. On the
other hand, each government has an interest in setting a high enough level
of capital tax to increase the size of its public sector devoted to the local
residents, but also to limit the level of competition on the private market
which has a negative impact on gross capital income.
Solving this system yields the following Nash tax equilibrium
t1 =
1
4 (b+ cN) τL
Λ(τ)
μ(cN+2b)2
−Υ (μ) θ
t2 =
1
4 (b+ cN) τL
Λ(τ)
μ(cN+2b)2
+Υ (μ) θ
(16)
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with Λ (τ) =
¡
2τb2 + 4bμcNτ − 4ba+ 2μc2N2τ − 4cNa− c2N2τ
¢
andΥ (μ) =
8μb+ cN (4μ− 1) /2 (12μb+ cN (6μ− 1))
The sign of the first term is ambiguous and depends on the sign of Λ (τ).
When
τ > τ∗ = 4a
cN + b
c2N2 (2μ− 1) + 4bμcN + 2b2 (17)
Λ (τ) and the first term in Nash taxes are positive, with τ∗ < τ trade for a
high enough level of μ14.
In what follows, we assume that these conditions are checked, so that
the government of the high productivity country has incentives to levy a
positive tax on profits. To sum up, this implies that the supply of public
good gives rise to scale returns in terms of utility and that transport costs
are high enough. The eﬀect of transport cost requires more detail. Indeed,
a transport cost decline strengthens the location forces coming from the
market since ∂2λr/∂tr∂τ = 2 (cN + 2b) /cNLτ3 (b+ cN) > 0. In other
words, the tax base erosion eﬀect, which induces governments to decrease
their capital tax, gets stronger as trade costs fall. Thus, governments have
to promote lower taxation to preserve their attractiveness. It is no more
profitable to levy positive taxation. That is why, we will focus throughout
the paper on high enough trade cost so that public good provision matters
for governments.
Some calculations show that the tax rate of the low productivity country
is also positive provided that the productivity wedge is low enough
θ > θ˜
ρ=0
= −1
2
(b+ cN) τLΛ (τ)
6μ (2b+ cN)− cN
μ (2b+ cN)2 (4μ (2b+ cN)− cN)
This condition is assumed to be checked in the rest of the paper because we
are interested in public good spillovers when there is a public sector in both
countries.
We can make two main comments about the expression of Nash taxes.
The first term in brackets is common to both countries and explains the
evolution Nash taxes with respect to the trade cost value, while the second
term relates to the evolution of Nash taxes with respect to the productivity
wedge. Considering the first component, we show that ∂tr/∂τ > 0 when
τ > τˆ = 2a
b+ cN
2b (b+ 2μcN) + c2N2 (2μ− 1) (18)
14More precisely, τ∗ < τ trade if and only if μ > μ¯ = b
2
(cN+2b)cN
+ 1. Since b2 < 1, we
consider this condition holds throughout this paper.
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whereas it is negative otherwise, with τˆ < τ∗. Thus, for the range of trade
costs such that taxes are positive, taxes decrease with the decline of trans-
port cost. Moreover ∂t1/∂τ = ∂t2/∂τ , so the decline of transport costs does
not aﬀect the tax gap.
Consider now the second term Υ (μ) in the expressions of the Nash taxes,
which is positive and enters with the opposite sign for each country. This
term tells us if asymmetric tax competition leads to the emergence of fiscal
incentives to capital flows. Evaluating the diﬀerence of taxes at the Nash
equilibrium yields the following tax gap
∆ρ=0 = t1 − t2 = −2 θ Υ (μ) (19)
which is positive. In other words, the taxation of firms is higher in the
most productive country. Indeed, on the one hand, the government of the
low productivity country has to set its capital tax to a lower level than the
other government in order to unless partially compensate its productivity
disadvantage. On the other hand, it is possible for the government of the
high productivity country to increase its residents’ welfare by choosing a
higher level of taxation because its productivity allows him to do so without
suﬀering from a capital outflow. Thus,
Proposition 1 The capital tax is higher in the high productivity country
than in the low productivity one.
Observe that this result can also be obtained with asymmetric population
size (Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005), Baldwin and Krugman (2004)),
and not only with an asymmetry in the technology of production.
3.1.2 Location equilibrium at the Nash taxes
Let now evaluate the location equilibrium at the Nash taxes. Inserting (16)
into (13), we get
λρ=0 =
1
2
− 2θμ (cN + 2b)
2
(12μb+ cN (6μ− 1)) cNL (b+ cN) τ2 (20)
which is higher than 1/2. In other words, the country with a productivity
advantage ends with a higher proportion of firms, even if its government
charges a higher tax rate on firms than does the other government. More
precisely, it yields complete agglomeration as soon as the wedge productivity
falls behind the following threshold value
θρ=0agglo = −
1
4
τ2cNL (b+ cN)
12μb+ cN (6μ− 1)
μ (cN + 2b)2
(21)
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which is lower than θ˜
ρ=0
. Hence,
Proposition 2 Asymmetric tax competition leads to a partial agglomera-
tion of firms in the most productive country, even if it chooses a higher level
of capital tax than does the other country.
We can wonder if tax competition enhances the existing agglomeration
forces or attenuates them. Because of the diﬀerence of productivity levels,
capital tax competition leads to fiscal incentives to invest capital in the low
productivity country where taxation is lower. So we can expect that asym-
metric tax competition without international public good spillovers acts as
a dispersion force. To verify this, we compare the location equilibrium re-
sulting from asymmetric tax competition given by (20) with the free-market
location equilibrium given by (9) :
λρ=0 − λM = θ (cN + 2b) 8μb+ cN (4μ− 1)
(12μb+ cN (6μ− 1)) cNL (b+ cN) τ2 (22)
which is negative. In other words,
Proposition 3 Asymmetric tax competition with local public goods yields
less agglomeration than at the free-market equilibrium.
3.2 With international public good spillovers
Now let assume the public good is nor a local public one, neither a inter-
national public one. Instead, we consider a parametrized model where the
degree of international spillovers is given by ρ ∈ ]0; 1[ whatever the coun-
try it comes from. Hence, the intensity of spillovers for one unit of public
good is symmetric across countries, but the aggregate eﬀect of public good
spillovers will vary with respect to the tax base allocation.
Politicians are supposed to be aware that their residents benefit from
these public good spillovers. However, they do not take into account the
fact that their own public sector is also beneficial to non residents. Hence
the internalization of public spending spillover is supposed to be asymmet-
ric : each government internalizes only public spending spillover coming
from the other government. Besides, contrary to Bjortvan and Schjelderup
(2002) who assume that each government perfectly internalize public good
spillovers generated by the other governments, we assume that governments
can underestimate the intensity of these spillovers. We follow the approach
of Kobayashi, Kunizaki and Nakamura (2003), and we suppose each govern-
ment expects that its residents benefit from a proportion ω ∈ ]0; 1[ of public
15
good spillovers coming from the other country. As a consequence, the lower
is ω, the less governments take into account the recursive eﬀects of its own
fiscal policy on public good spillovers its residents benefit from the other
government’s fiscal policy.
Thus the objective function of a government r is15 :
tr arg Max LSr + L+
πr
2
N + μ (Gr + ωρGs)
s.c Gr = trλrN
(23)
In such a context, interaction between governments is not only indirect be-
cause of capital tax competition, but also direct because the capital tax of
the other government enters directly in its own objective function through
the internalization of public spending spillovers. Thus, according to Rev-
elli’s (2004) classification of spatial interactions between governments, pub-
lic spending spillovers refer to the “preferences” channel of interaction16.
Public expenditures provided by a country enters directly the welfare func-
tion of the neighbored country17. As a consequence, fiscal externalities in
a decentralized framework can emerge both on the fiscal policy side and on
the public policy side of the governments’ intervention.
3.2.1 Stage 1: Nash tax equilibrium
The first order condition for the government’s r maximization problem is
given by
L
∂Sr
∂λr
∂λr
∂tr
+
N
2
∙
∂Πr
∂λr
∂λr
∂tr
+ 1
¸
+ μN
∙
∂λr
∂tr
tr + λr + ρω
µ
∂λs
∂tr
ts + λs
¶¸
= 0
(24)
for all r = 1, 2, with λr = λr (tr, ts) and ∂λr/∂tr < 0 because of the tax base
erosion eﬀect. From this expression, we can see that each government has
15Bjortvan et Schjelderup emphasize the major role of the parameter μ. They show
that the stronger are preferences for the public good, the more important is the distorsion
from tax competition relative to free-riding one.
16Brueckner (2003) also suggests a classification of strategic interactions between gov-
ernments. He distinguishes “resource-flow” models and “spillover” models. The first class
of model refers to the indirect interaction acting through budget constraints because of
tax competition. The second class of model includes public goods spillovers as well as
informational spillovers at the root of yardstick competition.
17Observe that this channel of interaction is very close to the third channel of interac-
tion exhibited by Revelli (2004) acting through expectations and reflecting behaviors of
yardstick competition.
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an additional incentive to choose a high level of tax thanks to public good
spillovers. A capital outflow following an unilateral increase in the capital tax
allows the other country to sustain a higher level of public good provision,
which increases the level of public good spillovers its residents benefit from.
In other words, the harmful tax base erosion eﬀect is partially counteracted
: it may be worthwhile for governments to strategically choose a high level
of tax in order to increase the benefit from positive public good spillovers.
Solving this system yields the following Nash tax equilibrium
tρ>01 = −Ψ (μ, ρ) θ + 14 (b+ cN)Lτ
Λ(τ)
μ(1−ρω)(cN+2b)2
tρ>02 = Ψ (μ, ρ) θ +
1
4 (b+ cN) τL
Λ(τ)
(cN+2b)2(1−ρω)μ
(25)
withΨ (μ, ρ) = 8μb+cN (4μ− 1) /2 (2μ (ωρ (2b+ cN) + 6b) + cN (6μ− 1)) >
0 and ∂Ψ (μ, ρ) /∂ρ < 0.
The tax of country 1 is always positive. Some calculations show that the
tax rate of the other country is also positive for the values of productivity
wedge such that θ > θ˜
ρ>0
, with
θ˜
ρ>0
= −1
2
(b+ cN) τLΛ (τ)
2μ (ρω + 3) (2b+ cN)− cN
(2b+ cN)2 (1− ρω)μ (4μ (2b+ cN)− cN)
(26)
Note also that ∂tr/∂τ is positive when τ > τˆ whereas these expressions
are both negative otherwise. Moreover ∂tρ>01 /∂τ = ∂t
ρ>0
2 /∂τ . Hence, public
good spillovers do not aﬀect the evolution of Nash taxes with respect to the
level of transport cost.
Now, we can wonder if the Nash tax is still higher in the high productivity
country. Considering the diﬀerence of taxes, we get
∆ρ>0 = t1 − t2 = −2 θΨ (μ, ρ) > 0 (27)
which exhibits a fiscal incentive to invest capital in the low productivity
country. This incentive decreases with the intensity of public good spillovers.
We will now evaluate the location equilibrium to see if in presence of
public good spillover, this fiscal incentive still does not compensate the pro-
ductivity disadvantage which acts in the opposite direction.
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3.2.2 Location equilibrium at the Nash taxes
Evaluating the level of agglomeration (13) at the Nash tax equilibrium (25)
we get
λρ>0 =
1
2
− 2μθ (cN + 2b)
2 (ρω + 1)
LcN (b+ cN) τ2 (2μ (ρω + 3) (cN + 2b)− cN) (28)
It yields complete agglomeration as soon as the wedge productivity falls
behind the following threshold value
θρ>0agglo = −
1
4
LcN (b+ cN) τ2
2μ (ρω + 3) (cN + 2b)− cN
μ (cN + 2b)2 (ρω + 1)
which can be lower or higher than θ˜
ρ>0
.
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that λρ>0 < λM because of the tax
gap. Tax competition still acts as a dispersion force in presence of public
good spillovers. Besides, observing the expression of the location equilibrium
given by (28), it is clear that agglomeration increases with the intensity of
public good spillovers. We get:
λρ=0 < λρ>0 < λM (29)
and consequently θMagglo > θ
ρ>0
agglo > θ
ρ=0
agglo. In other words, the dispersion
force induced by asymmetric capital tax competition is mitigated by positive
public good spillovers. To understand this result, we have to compare the
tax gap with and without public good spillovers, and we get ∆ρ=0 > ∆ρ>0.
This relation holds only for positive values of the internalization degree
of public good spillovers. Hence we have to focus on this parameter. We
show that ∂tρ>01 /∂ω > 0 and ∂t
ρ>0
2 /∂ω > 0 for positive values of taxes.
The government increases its tax when it gets a better information about
public good spillovers. The intuition behind this result is straightforward.
Because of positive public good spillovers, the negative tax base erosion eﬀect
caused by an unilateral increase of the capital tax is partially cancelled by
more public good spillovers. Hence, the higher the internalization degree
about this retroactive eﬀect is, the lower is the incentive to carry out tax
cuts. Moreover, ∂tρ>01 /∂ω < ∂t
ρ>0
2 /∂ω. Even if the intensity of public
good spillover is symmetric across countries, the low productivity country
benefits more from public good spillovers at the Nash equilibrium because
both the tax and the tax base are higher in the high productivity country.
As a consequence, following a rise in the level of the internalization degree,
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this country perceives more incentives to rise taxation. Thus, increasing the
internalization degree of public good spillovers favors tax convergence and
agglomeration18. This eﬀect is not exhibited by Bjorvatn and Schjelderup
(2002). Their model yields symmetric Nash taxes so that the allocation of
firms across countries is homogenous and consequently international public
good provision is also symmetric.
To summarize,
Proposition 4 Positive public good spillovers guarantees tax convergence,
provided that they are unless partially internalized by governments. More-
over, Nash taxes increase with the internalization of public good spillovers,
especially in the low productivity country which benefits the most from public
good spillovers.
We have seen that even if tax competition acts as a dispersion force,
the majority of firms is located in the high productivity country. To go
further, we can wonder how the international welfare will be aﬀected both
with respect to the private sector and the public one.
4 International welfare
As we have seen, the agglomeration of firms caused by the wedge produc-
tivity is stronger with public good spillovers. These disparities of tax base
across countries are not without eﬀects on the inequalities between residents
of each country.
To explore these inequalities, we have to define the eﬀective international
welfare. It diﬀers from the government’s objective function even if it is a
benevolent government because of its imperfect information about public
good spillovers. Thus, the eﬀective welfare in each country is given by
Wr = SrL+ L+ μ [λrtrN + ρ (λstsN)] +
πr
2
N
Since π1 = π2 at the location equilibrium and since the ownership of capital
is equally distributed across countries, we allready know that the capital
income net of tax is the same in each country. Thus considering the diﬀerence
18Contrary to Bjorvatn and Schelderup (2002), a perfect internalization degree does
not completely oﬀset the tax competition distorsion. In our framework with imperfect
competition, an unilateral tax cut yields a capital inflow which is always hamful for the
consumer’s surplus in the other region.
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between eﬀective welfare in each country, we get
Ω =W1 −W2 = L (S1 − S2)− μN (ρ− 1) (G1 −G2) (30)
To determine the sign of this expression, we first evaluate the diﬀerence
of workers’ welfare with respect to the private sector exclusively. Focusing
on the consumer surplus, it is straightforward to show that
LS1 − LS2 = −
1
2
LN (b+ cN)2 τ (2λ− 1) bτ − 2a
(cN + 2b)2
which is positive for all λ > 1/2. It reflects a higher consumer’s surplus in
the country 1, since this country hosts a majority of firms. Observe that
this diﬀerence increases with the intensity of public good spillover given by
the parameter ρ because it favors tax convergence and the agglomeration of
firms in the high-productivity country. This diﬀerence also increases with
the decline of transport costs which also fosters this agglomeration.
Considering now the diﬀerence in the size of the public sector between
countries we get:
G1 > G2 (31)
because both the tax and the tax base are higher in the high productivity
country. Hence, despite the equal number of citizens in each country, the
level of public good provision is higher in the country with the productivity
advantage. It goes against the principle of territorial equity according to
which citizen of diﬀerent countries should benefit from the same level of
public good provision.
Now let define T1 and T2 as the eﬀective public good provision in country
1 and 2 taking into account the benefit from public good spillovers:
T1 = λt1N + ρ ((1− λ) t2N)
T2 = (1− λ) t2N + ρ (λt1N)
Comparing T1 and T2 gives T1 − T2 = (1− ρ) (G1 −G2), which implies
that
G1 −G2 > T1 − T2 > 0 (32)
Once we take into account the benefit from public good spillovers, the
international inequalities with respect to the local public sector become less
important. As a consequence, given the expression (30) of the diﬀerence
between international welfare, it is clear that
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Proposition 5 Residents’ welfare is higher in the high productivity country,
because both the consumer’s surplus and the eﬀective public good provision
are higher in this country than in the low productivity one. Moreover:
(i) public good spillovers strengthen the inequality between international
consumer’s surplus in the private sector
(ii) the diﬀerence of eﬀective public good provision taking into account
public good spillovers is lower than the diﬀerence of size between local public
sectors.
Finally, as a decrease of transport costs aﬀects the tax base allocation
across countries, we have to see how the diﬀerence of welfare evolves with
it. We show that
∂Ω
∂τ
= −4aθμ (ρω + 1) (Nρ−N − ρω + 1) (b+ cN)
cτ2 (ρω − 1) (2μ (ρω + 3) (cN + 2b)− cN)
which is positive for all ρ < (N − 1) / (N − ω). As (N − 1) / (N − ω) > 1,
this condition is always checked. Consequently, a transport cost decline
favors the convergence of international welfare.
5 Fiscal externalities
On the one hand, we could suspect with capital tax competition that the
absolute level of taxes in each country is suboptimal because of the standard
positive fiscal externality exhibited by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). In-
deed when it increases unilaterally its tax rate, the local government does
not take into account the inflow of capital that the other country benefit
from. This fiscal externality is at the root of the race to the bottom process
: each country cuts its capital tax in order to attract capital flows. On the
other hand, thanks to the internalization of public good spillovers, govern-
ments may raise their expectations about positive feedback eﬀects of public
good provision in the other country. Hence, we can expect that the under-
provision of public good is mitigated so that taxes are higher. To resume,
we expect tax competition to create a distortion which should lead to a race
to the bottom, whereas public good spillovers are an other distortion which
could lead to a race to the top.
To see which one of these eﬀects is the stronger, we evaluate the eﬀects
of one country’s unilateral tax increase on the welfare in the other country.
The sign of the fiscal externalities diﬀers between countries and we can
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decompose the fiscal externality into four components :
∂Wr
∂ts
=
∂λr
∂ts
∂Sr
∂λr
L+
∂λr
∂ts
μNtr +
N
2
∙
∂Πr
∂λr
∂λr
∂ts
− 1
¸
+ ρμNλs (1 + εs)
(33)
where εr = (∂λr/∂tr) / (tr/λr) represents the tax base elasticity in region r
which is negative because of the tax base erosion eﬀect.
Consider the two first fiscal externalities : the first one acts through
the consumers’ surplus (∂LSr/∂ts) while the second one acts through the
national public good provision (∂ (μGr) /∂ts). Because of the tax base ero-
sion eﬀect, these externalities are unambiguously positive. An unilateral tax
increase produces a capital outflow toward the other country. This allows
this last country to sustain a higher level of public good provision and raises
their consumers’ surplus. Hence, abstracting from public good spillovers
and assuming that capital owners live outside the economy, asymmetric tax
competition with local public goods leads to a suboptimal level of tax in
both countries.
Now assuming that capital owners live inside the economy, there is a
third externality acting through the capital rent (∂ (πrN/2) /∂ts) which en-
capsulates two eﬀects: a direct eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect. An increase in
ts decreases directly the net profit in the country s which makes the country
r more attractive. On the other hand, increasing taxes on each firm reduces
operating profits because we have ∂Πr/∂λr < 0 and ∂λr/∂ts > 0. Attract-
ing more firms intensify the competition on the domestic market and pushes
down prices and operating profits. As a result, the net eﬀect of an unilateral
increase of the tax on firms’ profits seems ambiguous because the indirect
eﬀect is negative while the direct eﬀect is positive. However, inserting Nash
tax values into ∂ (πrN/2) /∂ts we can see that this expression is negative.
Thus, without public good spillover, the capital taxes might be too low
or to high from the social point of view. Inserting the Nash taxes into
∂W1/∂t2 and ∂W2/∂t1, we observe that ∂W1/∂t2 > 0 while ∂W2/∂t1 ≷ 0
when θ ≷ θ¨ > θ˜ρ=0. Thus, it seems that the low productivity country
always chooses a too low level of capital tax, while the capital tax of the
high productivity country is too low if its productivity advantage is low
enough (or if trade costs are high enough) and it is too high otherwise.
Let consider now the last fiscal externality caused by public good spillover,
which we can write as follows : ∂ (ρμGs) /∂ts. This eﬀect shows how the
public good spillovers coming from the country s evolves when this coun-
try increases unilaterally its tax. The sign of this derivative is ambiguous.
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This fiscal externality may be negative if the negative tax base eﬀect on
public good provision is stronger than the positive tax eﬀect. Hence, the
sign of this externality depends on tax base elasticities. We can check from
the expression (33) that the fiscal externality coming from the country s
is positive if εs > −1 and negative otherwise. Indeed, when the tax base
elasticities are limited so that we are on the increasing side of the Laﬀer
curve, then the negative tax-base erosion eﬀect is more than compensated
by the positive tax eﬀect on public good provision. The opposite occurs
when the tax base erosion eﬀect is so important that a marginal increase of
the capital tax has a negative impact on tax revenues. Inserting Nash tax
values into ∂ (ρμGs) /∂ts, the sign of this expression is ambigous for both
countries and may diﬀer across them. It means that contrary to Bjorvatn
and Schjelderup, public good spillovers may aggravate the ineﬃcient level
of public good provision in a country and mitigate it in an other country.
Finally we can show that ∂ (ρμG1) /∂t1 > ∂ (ρμG2) /∂t2 at the Nash equi-
librium. Hence, the extent and the sign of this fiscal externality vary across
countries. In other words, symmetric public good spillovers yields asymmet-
ric fiscal externalities which aﬀect the eﬃciency of the tax gap. Thus, they
do not only aﬀect the size of public sector across countries, but also firms’
location on the private one.
To resume, capital taxes may be too low or too high from the social
point of view19. Some calculations reveal that the net eﬀect depends on
which country increases unilaterally its capital tax. Indeed at the Nash
equilibrium, we get ∂W1/∂t2?0 whereas ∂W2/∂t1?0.
6 Conclusion
With the decline of transport costs, the risk of subnational tax competition
in a decentralized economy is reinforced because of higher capital mobility.
Moreover, it could to be associated with an other form of interdependence
between governments caused by public good spillovers. There are practical
reasons to integrate these two approaches, especially when we take into
account spatial disparities shaped by the decline of transport costs. It gives
the following outcomes.
Firstly, we show that public good spillovers aﬀect asymmetric tax com-
petition because it leads to a lower tax gap and thus a higher agglomeration
of firms within the high productivity country. This result gives rise to inter-
19Observe that when the capital ownership is widespread, we can neglect the fiscal
externality acting through the capital rent so that capital taxes are always suboptimal.
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national inequalities. Residents’ welfare is higher in the high productivity
country, because both the consumer’s surplus in the private sector and the
eﬀective public good provision are higher in this country than in the low
productivity one. The resulting diﬀerence of aggregate welfare is mitigated
by the decline of transport costs, while the diﬀerence of consumer’s surplus
is strengthened by public good spillovers and the decline of transport costs.
Secondly, we have evaluated the eﬃciency of these results by identifying
three kinds of fiscal externalities...
To summarize, we have exhibited some of the public good spillovers’
implications in a decentralized economy with spatial disparities. While the
empirical literature on public good spillovers often focuses on the control
of common shocks among countries which could bias the results, it does
not control the robustness of these results with respect to economies of
agglomeration. It could be interesting to go in this direction.
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